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Abstract 
Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) aims to reduce crime 
through the design of the built environment. Designing out Crime Officers (DOCOs) are 
responsible for the delivery of CPTED by assessing planning applications, identifying 
criminogenic design features and offering remedial advice. Twenty-eight experienced 
DOCOs from across England and Wales assessed the site plan for one residential 
development (which had been built a decade earlier) and identified crime risk locations. 
Predictions of likely locations were compared with four years’ police recorded crime 
data. DOCOs are, to varying extents, able to identify locations which experienced 
higher levels of crime and disorder. However, they varied widely in the number of 
locations in which they anticipated burglary would occur.  
 
Keywords: Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED); burglary; built 
environment; police; residential housing; planning; Designing Out Crime Officers 
(DOCOs).  
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 Introduction  
The manipulation of the built environment to reduce the opportunity for crime, disorder 
and the fear of crime is referred to as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design 
(CPTED) (Crowe, 2000). CPTED represents a multi-faceted approach to crime 
reduction. Drawing upon theories from environmental criminology, architecture and 
urban design, Armitage (2013) defines CPTED as: ‘The design, manipulation and 
management of the built environment to reduce crime and the fear of crime and to 
enhance sustainability through the process and application of measures at the micro 
(individual building/structure), meso (neighbourhood) and macro (national) level’ (p. 
23). CPTED is underpinned by a number of principles (Poyner, 1983; Cozens et al, 
2005; Armitage, 2013; Montoya et al, 2016; Armitage & Monchuk, 2017) with 
Armitage (2013) suggesting that there are five key principles: physical security; 
surveillance; movement control; management and maintenance and defensible space.  
 
Physical security aims to ensure that robust security measures (i.e. door and window 
locks) are installed on individual dwellings to withstand attack from offenders (Tilley et 
al, 2011; Grove et al, 2012; Brooke, 2013; Tseloni et al, 2017; Armitage, 2017). 
Surveillance aims to ensure residents are able to observe the areas surrounding their 
home and their neighbourhood and witness, challenge or report any suspicious 
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behaviour (Crowe & Zahm, 1994; Reynald, 2009; Armitage, 2017; Armitage & 
Monchuk, 2017). Movement control aims to ensure that opportunities for access, egress 
and through movement are minimised to prevent unauthorised access (Nee & Taylor, 
2000; Nee & Meenaghan, 2006; Johnson & Bowers, 2010; Armitage et al, 2011; Birks 
& Davies, 2017). Management and maintenance relates to the importance of ensuring 
that a development is free from graffiti, vandalism and litter. In doing so, it transmits 
signals to residents and visitors that the area is cared for (Cozens, 2008). Defensible 
space refers to the clearly defined ownership of space in a neighbourhood and 
encourages and promotes residents to feel a sense of responsibility for the areas adjacent 
to their home (Newman, 1973; Reynald & Elffers, 2009; Reynald, 2010). Schneider and 
Kitchen (2002) state that ensuring residents feel a sense of attachment to space helps to 
foster a willingness to take control of the area and defend it against intruders.   
 
CPTED depends for its realisation on a number of different agencies, notably the police, 
urban designers, planning authorities and housing developers. There is no shortage of 
evidence that the elements of CPTED are relevant to the incidence of crime (see for 
example Armitage & Monchuk, 2011), but this is not the focus of the research reported 
here. Crucially, there is as yet no evidence that those tasked with reviewing planning 
applications to predict a development’s future crime risk have the skill to do so. In 
short, is there a skill to the application of CPTED?  
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 The practical application of CPTED 
In medicine, interacting disease processes makes diagnosis challenging, yielding high 
rates of inaccurate diagnosis and a current movement to algorithm based diagnostic 
procedures (van Teije, 2017). The anticipation of crime locations is correspondingly 
challenging. Whilst some criminological research has examined the extent to which 
practitioners can identify locations of high crime (see Ratcliffe & McCullagh, 1999, 
2001 & McLaughlin et al, 2007 for example), to the writers’ knowledge, no previous 
research has sought to identify how good crime predictions are, as delivered in advice to 
planners. Professional expertise develops through the analysis of past performance, so 
this is a crucial gap in knowledge. A particular problem in the present context is time. 
Feedback on results comes only years after a development is built. A development 
needs to be designed, successfully receive planning permission, be built and then fully 
occupied. A means had to be devised to expedite feedback. The approach reported here 
should be seen as a viable first step in that process. Its necessary refinements are set out 
later in the paper. The role of crime prevention advice in planning will briefly be 
discussed before moving on to the core of the paper, a test of the expertise which lies at 
the heart of crime prevention advice.  
 
Crime prevention and planning across England 
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The importance of embedding CPTED into the design and planning of new 
developments across England has been documented in a number of key planning 
policies. Historically, this included Planning Policy Statements One and Three (ODPM, 
2005 & 2010) and guidance documentation such as Safer Places (ODPM, 2004) and 
World Class Places (DCLG, 2009). However, after a comprehensive review of planning 
practice guidance (DCLG, 2012a), these publications were disbanded and condensed 
into a single, standalone document – the National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF) 
(DCLG, 2012b; Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018). The 
introduction of the NPPF sought to streamline planning policy and “…provide coherent 
guidance on urban design principles that should be applied locally” (Paterson, 2012 p. 
144). Reference to the importance of CPTED in the design of new developments has 
remained within the NPPF which is crucial as it is this national policy which helps to 
shape local planning policy. Paragraph 91 of the NPPF states that planning policies and 
decisions should aim to achieve healthy, inclusive and safe places which:  
 
are safe and accessible, so that crime and disorder, and the fear of 
crime, do not undermine the quality of life or community cohesion 
(Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, 2018 p. 
25). 
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In addition, national Planning Policy Guidance (DCLG, 2012a; DCLG, 2014) further 
emphasises the role that design can play in the prevention of crime. Guidance states that 
local authorities should consider the prevention of crime when exercising its planning 
functions and that applicants should liaise with local police to ensure that crime-
reduction based planning measures are based upon a clear understanding of the local 
situation. More recently, the government’s Chief Planning Officer wrote to all Chief 
Planning Officers to remind them of the important role the planning system plays in 
preventing crime (DCLG, 2017). Whilst this policy and guidance states the importance 
of including reference to crime prevention at the local planning authority level, it fails to 
provide any specific instruction as to how this should be implemented in practice 
(Monchuk, 2016). 
 
Delivery of crime prevention 
In England and Wales, CPTED advice is delivered to planners by Designing out Crime 
Officersi (DOCOs). One or more such officers are employed within each of the 43 
police forces across England and Wales. They review planning applications and assess 
the extent to which a development may pose the opportunity for crime and disorder and 
how they might be mitigated by amendments in the plan. In addition to providing 
consultation during the pre-planning process, DOCOs can comment after the application 
has been submitted to the Local Planning Authority (LPA) and can recommend that an 
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application be approved, amended or refused. DOCOs seek to engage with urban 
designers during the concept stage to ensure that the principles of CPTED are 
incorporated from the outset. This accords with DCLG (2014) guidance which states 
that crime prevention should not be considered as a stand-alone issue and should be 
addressed alongside other design considerations. In many cases DOCOs review and 
comment on planning applications only after they have been submitted to the LPA 
(Wootton et al, 2009). The earlier a DOCO engages in the design process, the more 
seamlessly CPTED be can embedded in the design, thereby avoiding later objections by 
the police based upon crime concerns (Colquhoun, 2004; Schneider & Kitchen, 2007; 
Wootton et al, 2009; Monchuk, 2011; Monchuk, in press). Objections raised by the 
police late in the planning process can be frustrating for applicants. The greater the scale 
of recommended changes, the more expensive and time-consuming they will be 
(Monchuk, 2011). DOCOs are also responsible for delivering the Secured by Design 
(SBD) accreditation scheme. SBD is a UK police initiative which aims to encourage the 
building industry to design out crime (Secured by Design, 2016). Should a development 
receive SBD accreditation, this confirms that the development has been built to the 
principles of CPTED (Armitage & Monchuk, 2011). 
 
DOCOs are either: i) serving police officers; ii) retired police officers who have 
returned to force in a civilian support staff role or iii) civilian support staff with no prior 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
policing experience (Wootton et al, 2009; Monchuk, 2016). The background of DOCOs 
employed can differ within and across police forces (Monchuk, 2016). Historically, the 
role of a DOCO was undertaken by a serving police officer approaching retirement 
(Weatheritt, 1986). One of the key changes to policing across England and Wales has 
been the increased employment of lower-paid civilian staff (Newburn, 2003; HMIC, 
2004). This allows warranted police officers to concentrate on front-line duties which 
may require the power of arrest (Garland, 1996). Schneider and Kitchen (2007) warned 
that the civilianisation of DOCOs could be problematic as they suggest that a DOCO’s 
policing experience adds weight to comments they make on a planning application. 
However, Minton (2009) argues that the police should not be involved in the design and 
development process and is concerned that it may result in the over fortification of 
developments, which may increase levels of fear of crime. Minton (2009), writing 
specifically about the role of DOCOs in administering the SBD scheme, states:  
 
[this] leaves us in the strange position of having police officers, rather 
than architects, responsible for the way places look and feel, which 
can create bizarre places (p. 73).    
 
All DOCOs are required to complete a two week training course delivered by Police 
Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited. The course includes modules such as: CPTED; 
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the role of DOCOs; interpretation of plans and drawings and planning law and 
procedures. At the time of writing, Police Crime Prevention Initiatives Limited are 
seeking to professionalise the training delivered to DOCOs by introducing externally 
accredited learning and development qualifications. However, a review of the proposed 
content suggests that it largely remains the same. This is the only dedicated training that 
DOCOs receive on how to assess plans and drawings, irrespective of their background.  
 
Study rationale 
To date, academic literature has focused upon establishing the effectiveness of 
developments that have been built to the principles of CPTED and any associated 
reduction in crime (see for example Armitage, 2000; Teedon et al, 2010; Armitage & 
Monchuk, 2011). There is no literature of which the writers’ are aware, which tests the 
skill of DOCOs in identifying locations within a development which anticipate crime 
risks. A step toward addressing this gap in the literature was important, particularly in 
response to the publication by the Local Housing Delivery Group (2012) where key 
stakeholders with an interest in home building raised concerns about the inconsistent 
application of CPTED by individual DOCOs. 
 
As noted earlier, CPTED design is typically acknowledged by the award which permits 
the development as a whole to be badged as secure (SBD). However, in many ways the 
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plan by plan estimation of relative crime risks within a development is a more rigorous 
test of DOCO skills. Developments as a whole should meet common standards of 
security. Potential crime locations within developments should also be identifiable from 
CPTED principles. Thus, current literature fails to examine how those responsible for 
designing out crime in England and Wales (DOCOs) assess planning applications; how 
they go about applying the principles of CPTED and whether they are able to anticipate 
the locations of future crime risk once the development is built and occupied. Put 
brutally, the writers’ know of no current evidence to suggest that DOCOs can, by 
reviewing plans, predict where crime is likely to occur within a planned development.   
 
Attempting to establish whether DOCOs are able to predict the locations of crime is, in 
principle, very simple. One way would be to elicit their predictions of crime from plans 
for homes that have yet to be built and wait for a considerable amount of time (perhaps 
a decade) to find out whether they were correct. To shortcut the process, one can 
provide DOCOs with information about a development which has already been built 
and occupied, but with which they are unfamiliar. This approach was taken here. 
DOCOs were shown the site plan for one residential development. They were not told 
about the force area where it could be found, and none of them worked in the area 
concerned. They were asked to nominate the parts of the development they believe 
would prove problematic and experience incidents of crime and disorder, if built as 
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planned. The approach was an attempt to simulate (as closely as possible) what their 
everyday task would be in commenting on proposed developments. The predicted and 
actual burglary locations would then be compared, to test whether the predicted 
locations coincided with those which had suffered burglary dwelling and burglary other 
(e.g. sheds and detached garages)ii. 
 
This paper reports on the following three research questions:  
 To what extent do the 28 DOCOs identify different proportions of the development 
as at risk to burglary? This is important because of the practicalities of the planning 
process. If a DOCO chooses a large proportion of a development as problematic, it 
is doubtful whether built environment professionals will value the risk-averse 
expertise of the DOCO and make any proposed alterations.  
 Was there consensus in the locations chosen by DOCOs? Were there locations that 
all DOCOs deemed problematic? The extremes would be: complete consensus as to 
whether a location is vulnerable or random selection such that one DOCO’s 
judgement is unpredictable from another DOCO’s selection.  
 Did the locations chosen by most DOCOs experience burglary post-build? This 
establishes whether collectively DOCOs can anticipate crime locations better than 
chance. 
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Methodology  
Prior to outlining the methodology used, it may be helpful to cast the study’s approach 
in terms borrowed from psychometrics. A measurement tool’s value derives from two 
attributes, its validity (whether it measures what it purports to measure) and reliability 
(whether it does so consistently). In this study validity is established by the extent to 
which the locations predicted to host crime did so, and those which were predicted not 
to host crime did not do so. This is known as criterion-related validity. Within this 
study, reliability is tested as the extent to which DOCOs agreed with each other in their 
predictive judgements. If all DOCOs agreed and were correct in their judgements, it 
could be concluded that DOCOs judgements were both valid and reliable. The simple 
analogy with psychometrics breaks down when there are differences amongst DOCOs 
in the accuracy (validity) of their judgements. The other complication is that the picture 
is obscured if DOCOs differ in their relative tolerance of false positive and false 
negative judgements. If some over-predict and others under-predict crime risk, we 
encounter more complexity in interpretation of practice. Paradoxically, these more 
complex outcomes are especially valuable in thinking of training using the skills of the 
most valid judgement makers, and establishment of threshold risk levels common across 
DOCOs or gradations of risk measurement rather than dichotomous judgements. To 
anticipate our conclusions, the exercise reported here provides a proof of concept for a 
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more nuanced approach to the development and assessment of skills in the anticipation 
of crime in the yet to be built environment.  
Twenty-eight DOCOs that had been in post for the greatest amount of time, from the 
sample of 129 DOCOs that agreed to take part in the research, were recruited from 18 
police forces across England and Wales. A stratified purposive sampling method was 
employed to include DOCOs who were either: i) serving police officers; ii) retired 
police officers; iii) police civilian staff with a built environment background or vi) 
police civilian staff with no policing or built environment background. Participants 
included: five former built environment professionals; five serving police officers; 10 
retired police officers and eight civilian staff. Length in post ranged from five to 20 
years. The rationale for selecting the most experienced DOCOs was that it was 
considered that the more proficient participants were more likely to have experienced 
successes and mistakes and learnt from problem-solving situations, allowing them to be 
more reflective in their responses (Paloniemi, 2006).  
 
Selecting the residential case study site  
The site layout plan for a residential development that: i) had been built and was fully 
occupied and ii) experienced incidents of crime and disorder (as recorded by the local 
police force) was identified. Hard copy files for all relevant site plans and elevations 
were sought from the planning authority concerned. The development comprised 41 
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individual properties and four blocks of flats, with each block containing 12 individual 
flats. Thus, in total the development comprised 89 individual dwellings/addresses. The 
development incorporated 112 car parking spaces and communal cycle storage 
provision. Built in 2002, the development was fully occupied by the end of 2003. 
Burglary data recorded by the local police force during a four-year period (July 2006 - 
July 2010) were requested. The rationale for this time period was twofold. First, owing 
to a change in the police recording systems, it was not possible to obtain data prior to 
2006. Second, to ensure the data could be analysed and the remainder of the exercise 
designed, developed and administered, data post July 2010 could not be included. 
During the period of analysis, two burglary dwelling offences and six burglary other 
offences were recorded at six different locations. The authors’ acknowledge that both 
the four-year period of analysis and the small number of burglaries recorded during this 
time is a possible limitation. However, to the authors’ knowledge this is the first time 
that such an exercise has been conducted and so the design and implementation of the 
methodology should be considered both innovative and exploratory.    
 
Conducting the case study exercise 
Twenty-eight DOCOs were recruited as described above and invited to complete the 
case study exercise. The exercise was completed by the first author on a one-to-one 
basis. DOCOs were shown the site plan for the development (Figure 1) and provided 
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with generic information relating to the development (number of dwellings and car 
parking spaces). DOCOs are typically provided with this descriptive information when 
reviewing planning applications. DOCOs were asked to spend a couple of minutes 
reviewing and digesting the information provided and asked the two following generic 
questions:  
 
 From looking at the site plan, what initially do you like about the plan from a crime 
prevention perspective and why? and  
 What don’t you like about the plan and why?  
DOCOs were asked to think aloud to help understand: how they assessed the plan (e.g. 
as per the principles of CPTED or by working through the plan in a certain direction); 
how they went about assessing future crime risk and the comments they would make to 
the planning officer/applicant regarding the proposed design and layout. DOCOs were 
encouraged to annotate the site plan to mark the locations that they perceived to be 
vulnerable to crime and disorder. For each annotation, participants were asked to 
provide a justification as to why they had identified that area as vulnerable and to detail 
they would predict to occur at each location. After this general assessment, DOCOs 
were then asked to annotate the site plan to mark the locations that, in their professional 
opinion, were specifically at risk from burglary dwelling and burglary in a building 
other than a dwelling. DOCOs were told that two burglary dwelling offences and six 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
burglary other offences were recorded by the police between July 2006 and July 2010. 
This is the only information they were told. They were not told at how many locations 
these offences occurred, nor the specific locations of these offences. Thus, the data 
available for analysis comprises: a site plan for each of the 28 DOCOs annotated with 
the locations at which they predict burglary occurred (Figure 2) and the addresses of the 
dwellings that experienced burglary between July 2006 and July 2010 which were 
recorded by the police.  
FIGURE 1. Site plan provided to each individual participant   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
FIGURE 2.  Example of annotated site plan  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
Prior to presenting the key findings from this exercise, it is important to note the 
following. Although there were a total of 48 individual flats, each block rather than each 
individual flat was considered as the unit of analysis. This was to compensate for the 
fact that in some instances police recorded crime data relating to blocks of flats or 
apartments can lack detail (Armitage et al, 2011). Also, in the current study the plans 
provided did not distinguish individual flats, so there was no alternative to treating the 
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block of flats as a single address. Thus, the total number of properties included in the 
analysis was 45 (41 individual properties and four blocks of flats). 
Results 
As noted earlier, during the period of analysis, two burglary dwelling offences and six 
burglary other offences had been recorded at six different locations. The number of 
locations identified as crime prone by the 28 DOCOs varied from three to 31 (mean 
16.9, standard deviation 8.9). Figure 3 shows the distribution of numbers of locations 
identified as vulnerable by the participants. The suggestion from the data is that some 
DOCOs are risk averse in identifying many more homes as being burglary-prone than 
were victimised. Possible reasons for this are supplied in the discussion section of this 
paper. 
FIGURE 3. Number of locations DOCOs identified as vulnerable to burglary 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
Figure 4 shows the 45 locations within the development alongside the number of 
DOCOs who identified each location as vulnerable to burglary. The bars in black 
represent locations that were not victimised and those in with a dashed line denote a 
victimised location. It is interesting to note that no location was deemed vulnerable by 
all 28 participants, but that each of the 45 locations was identified as being vulnerable to 
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burglary by at least one DOCO. Each of the six burgled locations were judged 
vulnerable by at least 5 DOCOs with 18 DOCOs (64%) correctly identifying location 
D12 and 17 (61%) identifying location D23. 15 DOCOs (54%) identified location D25; 
12 (43%) identified location D8; 11 (39%) identified D24 and 5 (18%) identified
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FIGURE 4. Number of DOCOs identifying individual locations as vulnerable to burglary 
 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
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 location D19. What these data suggest is that DOCOs lack consensus in their assessment of 
risk of burglary. The implications of the variation identified above may be attributed to one of 
two reasons. First, if those locations were consistently identified as vulnerable by most 
DOCOs, the conclusion would be that they were making judgements true to CPTED, but 
CPTED is (necessarily) an imperfect predictor of burglary. If however, the CPTED obvious 
locations were not identified as vulnerable by most or all DOCOs, the DOCOs were using 
non-CPTED criteria of vulnerability. Analysis of the physical characteristics of each of the 45 
locations suggests that to a substantial extent, the latter account prevails. 
 
Did the locations chosen by most DOCOs experience burglary post-build? 
Whilst the data presented in Figure 4 show the locations which DOCOs deemed to be most 
vulnerable to burglary, it is important to identify whether DOCOs in the aggregate can 
predict the location of burglary. Put simply, were DOCOs in the aggregate better than chance 
in identifying burglary risks? Table 1 presents the relevant data and shows that in total 1,260 
predictions (28 DOCOs x 45 locations) were made. Looked at another way, Table 1 shows 
that a total of 472 predictions were made identifying locations as vulnerable, with 78 (17%) 
of these being correct – the location was identified as vulnerable and did experience burglary 
during the period of analysis. The remainder of predictions (n=394 or 83%) identified 
locations which were deemed vulnerable but did not experience any incidents of burglary 
during the period of analysis.  
 
TABLE 1. Contingency table of recorded burglary and identification as vulnerable 
  Identified as 
vulnerable  
Not identified 
as vulnerable 
TOTAL 
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DOCOs were able to identify the locations of the victimised and non-victimised locations 
rather better than chance. A chi-square test was performed to examine the relationship 
between the predictions made by the DOCOs. The relationship between these variables 
(vulnerability and victimisation) was significant, X2 (1df, N = 1260) = 6.65, p<0.05. DOCOs 
were better than chance in identifying the burgled homes. However it is acknowledged that 
the data breaches the requirement of independence of observations and it is presented only as 
suggestive.  
Discussion 
This is, as far as the writers’ know, the first study of an important topic and its limitations are 
acknowledged. The first potential concern is the impression which it gives of the limited and 
varied skill of DOCOs and such an impression is not justified. If CPTED is relevant to crime 
reduction, anticipation of crime on the basis of design attributes of developments should be 
better than chance. However how much better than chance it could be is not, and perhaps 
cannot ethically be determined. Characteristics of occupants, crime in contiguous areas, and 
prevailing rates of crime are other factors relevant to anticipated crime risk. 
Self-evidently, the study design meant that DOCOs could not physically visit the site and the 
surrounding area which is something that they may ordinarily do when assessing planning 
applications. The site was no longer a site! Further, the DOCOs were not able to discuss the 
specific aspects of the application with other key stakeholders (such as planning officers, 
Burgled  78 90 168 
Not burgled  394 698 1092 
TOTAL 472 788 1260 
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Highways, policing colleagues). During a number of the interviews, DOCOs enquired 
whether the development was located within an urban or a rural area and to ensure 
consistency across the sample, this information was not provided to the participant. Thus, the 
exercise did not provide the DOCOs with all the information required when undertaking their 
assessment and that would ordinarily be available to them.  
However, as all DOCOs in the work reported here were able to access the same information 
to inform their assessment, the authors’ are convinced that this was the best approach to 
adopt. Whilst the findings overall are positive, these findings represent the worst case 
scenario. Should the participants have been able to access additional data (such as police 
intelligence) their assessment of what locations were vulnerable to burglary, perhaps may 
have been more accurate. Finally, the findings are based upon police recorded crime data 
over a four year period. Thus, it might be the case that locations which have been identified 
by the DOCOs as being vulnerable do actually experience burglary in the future. However, 
this still would not address the disparity in which the DOCOs identified each of the 45 
locations as vulnerable.  
The research is about improvement, not criticism. It has, uniquely as far as the writers’ are 
aware, focused upon those responsible for its application and delivery. It has demonstrated 
that when presented with a residential plan, DOCOs are able to, to a varying extent, identify 
locations which have experienced burglary. However, this skill varies with some DOCOs 
identifying only a small proportion of the development as at risk, with others adopting a 
much more risk averse stance deeming a large proportion of the development at risk. This 
variation raises concerns about the inconsistency with which CPTED is implemented on the 
ground and reiterates the concerns raised by the Local Housing Development Group (2012). 
One could argue that this inconsistency is because in reality DOCOs are located across the 
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country and therefore regularly assess developments located in different areas, each with 
different crime risks and levels of crime. Thus, unknowingly, it is possible that the DOCOs 
assessed the development as if it was located within their own force area. Nonetheless, the 
rationale behind providing the 28 most experienced DOCOs with the same residential 
development and with the same generic information (i.e. the number of individual dwellings) 
was to elicit the extent of this variation. Further, it became clear that at least some of the 
judgements were not made with the principles of CPTED in mind, in that locations which 
were clearly vulnerable on the basis of CPTED principles were not identified as such by 
many DOCOs. However, DOCOs are the sole tasked gatekeepers of inbuilt home security, 
thus it is important that they are consulted and engaged as early in the design process as 
possible to work in collaboration with urban designers to incorporate crime prevention 
measures seamlessly into the design.  
 
It could be argued that it is more important to ensure that DOCOs adopt an over cautious 
approach and select all the potentially victimised sites, no matter how much of the site they 
deem vulnerable. However, if the application of CPTED is merely about adopting a risk-
averse, over-cautious approach to the design of new residential developments, one must then 
ask the following key questions. First, why does the plan need to be reviewed by a 
professional whose job it is to accurately predict future risk in the design of new 
developments? One could assume risk across entire developments and this would not require 
the skill of a professional. Second, if dedicated roles exist to try and predict risk, one needs to 
examine what makes these professionals skilled in assessing risk commensurate with 
predicted future risk. What qualities, experience and training have they undergone allowing 
them to perform this role adequately and what continuing training and professional 
development do they require to remain abreast of planning updates and criminological 
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research? There is no skill in someone assessing an entire development as risky, and it is 
highly likely that there will be a conflict with other key policies and agendas which are of 
equal importance to key stakeholders (Local Housing Development Group, 2012). However, 
there is skill in being able to draw upon knowledge and intelligence and undertake a 
comprehensive assessment to help make specific and targeted recommendations which are 
commensurate with the presenting risk. In short, the key skill is in differential risk 
assessment. The approach adopted by some of the DOCOs and the over-prediction of 
burglary risk demonstrates a lack of confidence in their predictive skill. For example, one 
DOCO identified thirty-one locations (69% of the total development) as vulnerable. This over 
cautious approach potentially relates to a fear about any repercussions should they have not 
predicted potential crime and disorder issues. In short, they may over-predict because they 
fear failure. This research has confirmed that there is a skill to applying CPTED at the 
planning stage. However, it also confirms that there is scope for the skill to be improved and 
the authors’ strongly argue that the role of DOCOs must be afforded more attention in terms 
of training and continued professional development.    
 
The writers’ believe that elaboration of the research design adopted here has both immediate 
usefulness as a training approach and is capable of refinement as a research tool. First, let us 
rehearse its usefulness as a training tool. Its advantage over any alternative is that it can short 
circuit the lengthy delays in feedback of results as to the crime rate of new developments. By 
rating plans of developments which have in fact been built in the past and whose crime 
experience is now evident, DOCO judgements may be tested more or less immediately. The 
writers’ envisage the incorporation of the approach as an essential part of DOCO training, in 
which officers make individual judgements of plans, which are then compared, against each 
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other and against CPTED principles. This would be tested by a movement towards consensus 
and may well yield supplementary ideas to CPTED orthodoxy.  
 
As for research refinement, the writers’ envisage providing the same plan but with different 
supplementary information, for example about the crime history of contiguous areas. They 
also envisage the use of older plans to gain crime data over the longer term to see whether 
DOCO recommendations become more or less salient to crime outcomes over the short or 
longer term. The approach could also readily be extended to other crime types.  
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